Hello – Below is suggested answer to the problem question on p43 of your booklet. It is only bullet pointed and does not relate to the parties within the problem (which you would have to do!).
- Article 34 and its function – it is the principle provision in the Treaty designed to eliminate national barriers to the free movement of goods which are not fiscal in character. There has been much litigation before the ECJ on this subject.
- Article 34 – Quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect shall be prohibited between Member States. Article 35 – Quantitative restrictions on exports and all measures having equivalent effect shall be prohibited between Member States.
- Directive 70/50 – Art 2 = this directive covers measures other than those applicable equally to domestic or imported products which hinder imports which could otherwise take place including measures which make importation more difficult or costly than the domestic production. Art 3 = the directive also covers measures governing the marketing of products which deal in particular with shape, size, weight, composition, presentation, identification or putting up and which are equally applicable to domestic and imported products where the restrictive effect of such measures on the free movement of goods exceeds the effects intrinsic to trade rules.
- Definition of “quantitative restriction” – Geddo v Ente 1973 ECR 865 meaning measures which amount to a total or partial restraint of according to the circumstances imports, exports or goods in transit
- Measures Having Equivalent Effect to a Quantative Restriction – Procureur du Roi v Dassonville 1974 ECR 837 – ECJ defined MEQRs as “all trading rules enacted by MS which are capable of hindering directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-community trade”.
- Directive 70/50 Art 3 refers to ‘indistinctly applicable measures’ = something on the surface does not breach Art 28/29 but may discrimatory and its actual intention is to protect the domestic market. Walter Rau v de Smedt 1983 2 CMLR 496
- Re-defining MEQR under ‘Cassis de Dijon + ‘Keck’
- Cassis de Dijon – 2 principles – it provided an impetus towards free trade. The judgement was used to strike down German legislation which had the effect of protecting the German producer from competition – such market partitioning subverts the concept of a common market. The 2nd principle is a presumption that goods lawfully produced and marketed in one MS may be lawfully marketed in another MS. The 1st principle states that pending harmonization, MS may legislate in areas such as the marketing of alcohol but if such national laws result in obstacles to trade, they can only be justified as satisfying a mandatory requirement i.e. public interest/health concern. See also Gilli & Andres 1981 1 CMLR 146 + Commission v Germany (Beer Purity) 1987 ECR 1227.
- Keck & Mithouard 1993 ECR I 6097 (clarification of Art 34) – parties tried to in act Art 36 as a restriction to free trade. Not contrary to EC law. In post-Keck cases then the ‘selling arrangements’ have to be looked at. See Verband Sozialer Wettbeweb v Clinique Lab (Estee Lauder) 1994 ECR I-317
- So – Cassis de Dijon – If ok in MS A then ok everywhere Keck – Selling arrangement [“modes of marketing”] are ok, provided apply to all affected traders